ORIGINALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION:
A SHELBY COUNTY CASE STUDY
KAIYA M. A. ARROYO
The “construction zone” is ineliminable: the actual text of the U.S.
Constitution contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require
constitutional construction for their application to concrete constitutional
cases.
-

Lawrence Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction.

INTRODUCTION
No comparison or discussion of constitutional interpretation theories is
complete without mentioning originalism. Regardless of personal feelings
about the theory’s efficacy as a valid conception of constitutional interpretation, it is now beyond dispute that the doctrine has ascended as one of the
primary methods of constitutional adjudication. This is hardly surprising.
While there are many groups of thought as to what originalism “really
does,” its core tenets–-(1) the notion of fidelity to the Constitution1 and (2)
the desire to curb judicial activism2–-appeal to the most intimate democratic American sentiments. The Constitution represents both an original consensus of law by the people and a supermajority of that consent. In contrast, judicial policymaking by unelected officials is often viewed as an
affront to democratic governance. It harkens back to feelings of preAmerican colonialism where British magistrates and other foreign leaders
imposed their will upon the majority. From this backdrop, originalism fits
nicely within the traditional notion of American democracy.3
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Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1250 (1997) (discussing judicial fidelity to the constitution in the context of different interpretive philosophies).
Edwin Meese, Speech Before the American Bar Association (Jul. 9, 1985) (explaining that discovering the original intention of the Framers is required to curb judicial activism).
Indeed, this sentiment is one going back centuries. In this paper, I will discuss the original public
meaning of enforcing provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment through “appropriate legislation.”
When legislation for the enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments was being considered,
the representatives declared this sentiment as the bedrock of the nation, and used that rhetoric to
buttress their understandings of what legislation would be “appropriate.” For example, Repre-
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It is unclear, however, whether the originalism theory, in practice,
serves as the proper conduit to execute these ideas. Often, we see Supreme
Court opinions where the majority and dissent offer opposing outcomes
that are still arguably in line with an originalist approach.4 If the original
meaning of the text is the law, how can this be?
The answer to this question may be rooted in the way that judges make
decisions in practice. Georgetown Law Professor Lawrence Solum5 provides a theory of constitutional interpretation in which constitutional decision-making is ubiquitously broken into two parts: constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction.6 Constitutional interpretation is the
process by which judges determine the communicative and linguistic content of the text, while constitutional construction is the process by which
judges take that content to construct a rule or holding. Although a judge is
constrained by the original interpretation, the construction step requires a
judge to use methods of interpretation beyond a discovery of the text’s
original linguistic meaning.
Herein lies the problem: if originalism concerns the determination of
the communicative and linguistic content of the text, then a discovery of
the original public meaning of a text is not sufficient to create a rule or
holding, and the initial allure of the theory as one that constrains judges and
keeps fidelity to the law is unfounded. Judges will still be required to use
normative methods of constitutional construction to determine what the law
is.7
Unsurprisingly, many originalist adherents disagree that constitutional
interpretation is bifurcated into interpretation and construction. Indeed, in

sentative James Leach (D) of North Carolina began his soliloquy against House Bill 320 with
this speech:
Mr. Speaker, the Constitution of the United States, when observed in all its provisions
and administered in its integrity, is worth more to a great nation, infinitely more, than all
the political parties and politicians in the world. . . . [T]he Constitution, framed as it was
for all time . . . was based upon principles so just and grand, so sacred and ever-living in
their character and object, as to render them indissoluble and perpetual, as they were intended to be by their illustrious founders.
Leach of North Carolina, Globe, 42nd Cong.,1st sess., Appendix, p. 478.
4
See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down the Voting Rights Act
§4(b) as unconstitutional); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)
(striking down a gun restriction in Washington, D.C.).
5
Professor Lawrence Solum is a legal theorist and the Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law at
Georgetown University. He has written extensively on the issue of constitutional interpretation
and is known for the constitutional construction argument that will be expounded upon in this
paper.
6
Lawrence Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. R. 453, 453
(2014).
7
For the purposes of this paper, the term “normative methods of constitutional construction” describes whichever method of construction that a judge elects to use when constructing a rule or
holding. As Professor Solum states, these methods of statutory construction are selected by each
judge.
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Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, the late Justice Antonin
Scalia rejects Professor Solum’s construction zone theory by arguing that
any post-interpretation rulemaking is severely constrained by the text’s
original public meaning and can be further constrained through a method of
textual interpretation called the Fair Reading Method.8 This method invokes a combination of textual and interpretive canons in an attempt to
cabin judicial discretion.
However, textualism and originalism are distinct theories of interpretation. This comment argues for the ubiquity of the construction zone when
dealing with litigated constitutional questions. Justice Scalia’s Fair Reading Method, while possibly a good method of construction, is merely another normative method of constitutional construction that is not actually a
part of originalism as a theory. The existence of the interpretation/construction distinction is admitted once it is recognized that more
work must be done to get a rule or holding after the discovery of the original meaning of the text.
Shelby County v. Holder, a 2013 Supreme Court decision, provides an
interesting case study to explore the manner in which constitutional construction can lead to divergent understandings about what the law actually
is. Shelby County, which invalidated § 4b of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, which set the criteria for state who would be required to obtain preclearance from the federal government before implementing changes to
their voting procedures. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, determined that the Voting Rights Act unconstitutionally infringed upon state
equal sovereignty, while Justice Ginsburg’s dissent argued that the Fifteenth Amendment’s Appropriate Legislation Clause abrogated that sovereignty. Both Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg come to reasonable, opposing positions that the original understanding of “appropriate legislation”
can be interpreted to both compel and deny abrogation.
Assuming that neither justice would ignore the validity of a constitutional amendment, such opposing decisions can only result if the interpretation of the Appropriate Legislation Clause produced a vague, loosely constrained understanding of the law that required further normative
constitutional construction.9 This comment explores this idea by walking
through the constitutional interpretation theory, as explained by Professor
Solum, with the Appropriate Legislation Clause. If the original public
meaning can produce a constraining principle without further normative
construction, then Justice Scalia’s rejection of the theory is well-founded.

8
9

Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 8
(2012).
For a discussion of the problem with normative constitutional construction, see footnote 7, supra,
and accompanying text. See also footnote 15-16, infra, and accompanying text.
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If not, perhaps this case provides an example of a large flaw with originalism as a theory.
Section I will explain Professor Solum’s constitutional interpretation
theory as a two-step process and the major criticisms of that theory–namely, the rejection of the construction zone or the belief that the constraint principle provides a sufficient safeguard against judicial overreach.
Section I will also explain the Shelby County v. Holder decision and how it
serves as a good case study for the construction theory. Section II will provide a background of the Voting Rights Act and § 4(b) of the Act. Section
III(a) will walk through the constitutional interpretation step with the Appropriate Legislation Clause to determine if a constraining principle can be
found. Finally, Section III(b) will analyze whether originalism delivers on
its two main tenets.
I. UNDERSTANDING ORIGINALISM AS A TWO-STEP PROCESS
A. Understanding Constitutional Interpretation and Construction
Professor Solum’s article, Originalism and Constitutional Construction,
advances a theory of constitutional interpretation that distinguishes between the actual interpretation of constitutional text and the construction of
the text to determine its legal effect.10 Constitutional interpretation, in Professor Solum’s view, is “the activity that discovers the communicative content or linguistic meaning of the constitutional text,”11 while constitutional
construction “is the activity that determines the legal effect given the text,
including doctrines of constitutional law and decisions of constitutional
cases or issues by judges and other officials.”12
Constitutional interpretation is both the preliminary step in all judicial
decisions and is governed by the core principles of originalism: fixation
and constraint.13 Solum agrees with a majority of his peers that the linguistic meaning of the text is unchanging and is determined at the time of its
framing and ratification. He also asserts that, once the original understanding of the word or phrase has been determined, that understanding must
constrain the constitutional construction of the final legal rule.14
Constitutional construction, by contrast, is the normative process conducted by judges once a judge has discovered the constraints of the text’s
original understanding through interpretation.15 These theories need not
10
11
12
13
14
15

See Solum, supra note 6 at 453.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 460.
See Lawrence Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. R. 453,
474-75 (2014).
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connect with originalism in any significant way other an initial adherence
to the constraints discovered in the interpretation process. Regardless of
the normative philosophy for construction that was used to reach a decision, a particular case is appropriately decided as long as the original understanding of the text does not conflict with the decision reached by the
judge.16
While Professor Solum’s article attempts to resolve some tensions between originalism and its critics, it in fact exposes the theory to two glaring
flaws. Originalism is championed as a bulwark against judicial overreach
and traces its own origins to the works of advocates such as Robert Bork,17
William Rehnquist,18 and Edwin Meese.19 Its supporters advocate for
originalism because they believe that finding the original public meaning of
the text ensures that judicial decisions remain faithful to the law. If Professor Solum is correct, however, originalism can neither (1) force judicial restraint nor (2) truly maintain fidelity to the law.
If the original meaning of the text is only the first step in the process of
developing a rule, then only constraints discovered during interpretation
can impede or assist judges in their duties. To be sure, constitutional construction requires understanding the terms that were given to us by the
Framers and allowing that understanding to require certain holdings and
militate against others. However, if the plain meaning of the text is irreducibly vague, understanding the original public meaning will bring judges
only nominally closer to reaching a decision in a particular case.
If the existence of the construction zone neither restrains judges nor fully leads them to create rules that are faithful to what the law really is, then
for many constitutional questions, the general premises upon which the
theory is purported to be the superior method of constitutional interpretation may be unfounded. This is true if construction happens in every constitutional judicial decision.20 While there is clear, unambiguous language

16

17

18
19
20

When describing the construction zone, Professor Solum stipulates that constitutional construction is “essentially driven by normative concerns.” He then explains his theory using two “toy”
philosophies of construction–-constitutional Thayerianism and the Moral Readings Theory. Both
theories reach disparate results based on their normative values of decision making, and both are
seen as acceptable in the construction phase. See Solum, supra note 6 at 472-73.
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8
(1971) (discussing the importance of judicial adherence to the text and the history, and their fair
implications) .
William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 696-697
(1976).
Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association, July 9, 1985, in ORIGINALISM:
A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47, 47-48 (STEVEN G. CALABRESI, ED., 2007).
See Solum, supra note 6 at 495-500 (arguing that the construction zone is ubiquitous in judicial
decision making). While there are many constitutional clauses that are unambiguous, much of
the Constitution’s language is filled with terms that create ambiguity. This ambiguity will be
discussed further below in notes 19-28, infra.
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in much of the constitution that results in a strict constructionist application
of the text, those situations are far less likely to be litigated.
Take, for example, the constitutional provision that “neither shall any
Person be eligible to [the President’s] Office who shall not have attained to
the Age of thirty five Years.”21 If, in the next presidential cycle, a 32-yearold candidate attempts to run, the original meaning of the text will fully
constrain any rule that a judge may create. The language is clear enough to
leave no room for construction. Similarly, the Constitution also states that
“[t]he Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State.”22 If any cases arise in which three Senators are elected in Massachusetts, the construction zone is again entirely diminished, as the original meaning provides a clear interpretation of what the law should mean
and precludes any further judicial interpretation.
In these scenarios, the construction of the statute’s text into a workable
rule allows for nothing else. However, these cases are at the core of the
text’s determinate meaning. This also means that the likelihood that these
cases would go to trial at all, much less make it to the Supreme Court, is
almost nonexistent.23 Most litigated constitutional provisions do not fall
into this category. Consider, for example, the wealth of case law surrounding the First Amendment’s prohibition on “abridging the freedom of
speech”24 or the Fourth Amendment’s language discussing “unreasonable
search and seizure.”25 The key distinction between these examples and the
examples above are that the highly litigated text contains “vague” language, or language that is not clearly defined.26
Even Professor Solum recognizes that often, the construction of constitutional text is too “vague or irreducibly ambiguous” to provide determinate answers to constitutional questions, and so judges are necessarily re21
22
23
24

25

26

U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
Frederick Schauer, Rules In Law and Elsewhere, in THINKING LIKE A LAWYER, 13, 32-37, 15253 (2009) (discussing the concept of “core” versus “penumbral” cases).
U.S. CONST., amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
U.S. CONST., amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
See Vague Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY.COM http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/vague (defining what vague can mean). See also Solum, supra note 6, at
470 (describing the possible meaning of “vague”). “Vague” language can often result in penumbral or borderline cases in which it is unclear whether certain acts or objects fall within the defined term provided by the drafters. This also leads to an increase in litigation surrounding these
particular amendments and phrases. See Schauer, supra note 23, at 136 (examining how ambigious language can be interpreted).
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quired to construct an applicable holding or legal doctrine from tools beyond the actual plain meaning of the text.27 At this point, the two great rationalizations for originalism – textual fidelity and judicial restraint – become nullified. Solem concedes that while constitutional interpretation is
highly fact-driven, constitutional construction is “essentially driven by
normative concerns.”28 What’s more, he admits:
“[S]ome theories of constitutional construction may be driven by consideration
of political morality, whereas other theories may look to norms that are internal
to legal practice. The abstract fact that construction is essentially normative
does not entail any particular account of the norms that ought to govern the
practice of construction.29

Of course, many originalists believe that the construction zone, if it exists at all, is relatively minor. They argue that by implementing the terms of
art or original methods that the Framers used at the time of ratification,
judges can make precise determinations of vague terms.30 Others argue that
the creation of constitutional default rules diminishes the construction
zone,31 and some call for deference to the political branches in situations of
uncertainty.32 However, these theories conflate originalism with other distinct methods of statutory and constitutional interpretation.
The most highly debated and problematic decisions often require interpretation and construction of irreducibly vague constitutional texts. In
these cases, the construction zone gives judges the freedom to select any
one of several theories of construction which could each lead to a different
outcome in a given case. Indeed, in Professor Solum’s explanation of the
normative nature of the construction zone, two opposite theories of interpretation are utilized. Each begins with a search of the original communicative context and ultimately reaches opposite results.33 If originalism can
take judges only halfway to an answer and ultimately leaves the interpretive method to the individual judge, then the theory neither explicates the
law nor cabins judicial discretion. In this light, the theory ultimately be27
28
29

30
31
32

33

See Solum, supra note 6, at 519 (recognizing the ambiguity of the language of the Constitution).
See Solum, supra note 6, at 472 (noting that Constitutional interpretation is driven by normative
concerns).
See id. (emphasis added) (noting that the political morality plays into Constitutional interpretation). Essentially, this statement concedes that originalism places no other conditions on normative methods besides fixation and constraint, which allows the judge to select a method that could
be best suited to his or her own ideals.
John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalist: A New Theory of
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009).
See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.C.L. REV. 1225, 1226 (2012) (outlining his
argument regarding the construction zone).
See Solum, supra note 6 at 514-520 (discussing Michael Paulsen’s argument that a version of
Thayeriansim can shrink, but not destroy, the construction zone). The three main arguments asserted here are beyond the scope of this paper. For an explanation and rebuttal of these positions,
see id. at 503-520 (examining Thayeriansim and the construction zone).
See id. at 472-73 (describing the role of normativity in the construction zone).
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comes unhelpful, at least in the constitutional context where so many
clauses contain irreducibly ambiguous and vague language.
B. Challenging the Ubiquity of the Construction Zone
Unsurprisingly, many scholars have an alternate view of originalism
and its role in constitutional interpretation. In his book, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts, Justice Scalia and his co-author, Bryan Garner, champion originalism as a way to provide a “generally agreed-on approach to the interpretation of legal texts.”34 The authors declare originalism to be “the soundest, most principled one that exists”35 as it “instructs
interpreters to ‘look for meaning in the governing text, ascribe to that text
the meaning that is has borne from its inception, and reject judicial speculation about both the drafters’ extra-textually derived purposes and the desirability of the fair reading’s anticipated consequences.”36 In short, Justice
Scalia champions originalism for the virtues that the construction principle
calls into question.
Consequently, the late Justice Scalia had no patience for the construction zone theory. In his book, he dismisses the theory as illegitimate,
claiming that the distinction is irrelevant and has never been used among
actual practitioners.37 However, it is unclear whether Justice Scalia’s views
on legal decision-making greatly differ in practice. In Reading Law’s introduction, Justice Scalia describes his philosophy of interpretation and champions textualism as the proper method of construction.38 Throughout his
explanation, it becomes clear that the justice’s views on construction fit
squarely within the interpretation/construction distinction.
His explanation begins by stating that “exclusive reliance on the
text….elicits both better drafting and decision-making.”39 It is also well
documented that for Justice Scalia, any textual investigation is defined by
its probing inquiry into the original public meaning of that text while rejecting extra-textual intents and purposes.40 This understanding perfectly
aligns with the interpretation step as described by Professor Solum. Both
authors agree that the first step in the judicial decision-making process is to

34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Scalia, supra note 8 at xxvii.
See id. (describing the need for a unifying way of interpretating the law).
Mitchell Berman, Judge Posner’s Simple Law, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 777, 782 (2015).
See Scalia, supra note 8 at 14-15 (discussing the falseness of the distinction between interpretation and construction).
See id. at 15-36 (advancing a textual approach to legal interpretation and describing a general
overview of the theory in practice).
See id. at 16.
See Berman, supra note 36at 782-83; see also Scalia, supra note 8, at 15-17 (describing textualism), and ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997) at 27.
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look to the text for its original meaning and constrain any decision to that
understanding.41
However, Reading Law also discusses the concept of “permissible
meanings.”42 It recognizes that words can be both ambiguous – having two
or more meanings – and vague – having an uncertain application to an unquestioned meaning.43 While Reading Law argues that this concept is not
distinct from constitutional interpretation, it admits that there are occasions
when the original understanding of the text’s communicative content has
taken the judge as far as it can. This admission is fatal to a denial of the
construction zone.
This definition of vagueness is precisely what Professor Solum argues
creates the construction zone.44 By admitting that vagueness exists, Justice
Scalia acknowledged that something more than mere interpretation of a
text’s communicative content is required. In fact, when describing the Fair
Reading Method, which the Justice determined to be the best method for
staying true to the true textual understanding,45 He incorporated the “permissible meanings” concept, which grants that certain words and phrases in
a statute can be reasonably read to mean more than one thing. The method
aids judges in choosing between these permissible meanings.
While Justice Scalia placed this method within the interpretation step,
constitutional interpretation is the process of understanding the original
public meaning of the words themselves. In contrast, construction is the
process by which that meaning is transformed into a rule. The original
meaning of the text can be discovered and the language can still be ambiguous or vague—have more than one permissible meaning. The construction zone is where judges take the understood original public meaning and
determine the words’ application through other means of statutory construction.
Essentially, the Fair Reading Method is a strictly textual constructional
approach to determining the law. However, this is merely another normative method of construction. Once Justice Scalia conceded that the text’s
communicative content provides more than one permissible meaning, he
moved beyond constitutional interpretation and into the construction zone.
What’s more, by recognizing that vague language is a recurring phenomenon which necessitates further construction, the justice added credence to
the assertion that construction is present in most litigated cases.

41

42
43
44
45

See text accompanying notes 14-16, supra; see also, Scalia, supra note 8, at 31 (“A fundamental
rule of textual interpretation is that neither a word nor a sentence may be given a meaning that it
cannot bear.”)
See Scalia, supra note 33, at 31.
See id. at 32; see also note 26 supra and the discussion of vague terms in the accompanying text.
See Solum, supra note 6, at 469-70.
See Scalia, supra note 8, at 33.
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C. Shelby County v. Holder – A Case Study
Shelby County v. Holder, which overturned portions of the Voting
Rights Act as unconstitutional, provides an interesting practical example of
the construction/interpretation distinction. In the opinion, the majority and
dissent base their holdings on interpretations of the Tenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. The majority held that portions of the Voting Rights Act
impermissibly abrogated state equal sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment,46 while the dissent argued that the original public understanding of
the Fifteenth Amendment’s “appropriate legislation” provision empowered
Congress to do so.47
In his majority opinion, Justice Roberts pays short shrift to Justice
Ginsburg’s “appropriate legislation” argument, dismissing it as less pressing than Tenth Amendment concerns of state equal sovereignty.48 However, the opinion was unclear about why state equal sovereignty is more important than the Fifteenth Amendment’s grant to Congress. Article V of
the Constitution describes the amendment process by which a previous portion of the Constitution can be superseded.49 When an Amendment is
passed, the new Amendment supersedes the original language inasmuch as
that language conflicts with the original text. If the Fifteenth Amendment’s
“appropriate legislation” language conflicted with the idea of state equal
sovereignty, the Tenth Amendment would seem to be abrogated to the extent that there was a conflict.
While Justice Roberts’ actual reasoning and justifications are unknowable, general knowledge of the amendment process would imply that the
chief justice did not merely ignore the Appropriate Legislation Clause, but
rather had a different understanding of its meaning and application. Accordingly, this situation creates a perfect hypothetical to test the interpretation/construction distinction theory.
Shelby County highlights the ease with which two judges can stay faithful to the original public meaning of constitutional text and reach opposing
decisions regarding whether a statute comports with the Constitution. The
remainder of this comment investigates the original understanding of the
Appropriate Legislation Clause to determine if reliance upon the natural
and reasonable meaning of that clause can provide a constraining principle
to the question in Shelby County. If such a principle cannot be found, the
determination of a rational method to choose between options would neces46
47
48

49

See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2623-24 (2013).
See id. at 2648-50 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
State equal sovereignty is the idea that all states have a right to be as equally free from federal
interference as other states. In Shelby County, Alabama qualified under Section 4(b) and argued
that the legislation subjected them to federal preclearance for voting changes while other states
were not, thereby making the states who did qualify less sovereign than their counterparts.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
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sarily be a normative method of construction, and perhaps give credence to
the idea of a ubiquitous construction zone.
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE APPROPRIATE
LEGISLATION CLAUSE
Fifty years ago, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
has since played an instrumental role in securing the minority franchise in
America.50 One of the driving forces behind the Act’s potency is Section 5,
which declares that before enacting any change in a voting “qualification,
standard, practice, or procedure:”
any State or political subdivision with respect to the prohibitions set forth in
section 4(a)…may institute an action…for declaratory judgment that such qualification… does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, and unless . . . the court
enters such judgment[,] no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to
comply with such qualification…or procedure.51

States subject to preclearance are defined in Section 4(b) as jurisdictions that (1) maintained “any test or device” designed to abrogate the minority vote, and (2) in 1964, had less than half of eligible voters participate
in the year preceding the Act’s passage.52 The original requirements set in
place under Section 4 were set to expire after five years.53 However, Congress continually returned to the issue of voting rights throughout the intervening decades and investigations before the Act’s reauthorization in 1970,
1975, 1982, and 2006 led Congress to determine that voter discrimination
continued to be a pervasive evil in society.54
Three years ago, Shelby County v. Holder struck down § 4(b) of the
Voting Rights Act as an unconstitutional infringement upon state equal
sovereignty. The 5-4 decision featured Chief Justice Roberts’ majority
opinion, which held that the Act’s requirement that some, but not all, states
would be subjected to preclearance was unconstitutional under the Tenth
Amendment, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which championed the Act as
both a necessary and constitutional buttress against minority voter suppression under the Fifteenth Amendment’s Appropriate Legislation Clause.

50
51
52
53
54

See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438 § 5 (2012).
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438 § 4(b) (2012).
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438 § 4(a) (2012).
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2620-21 (2013), and id. at 2635-36, 2640-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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III. INTERPRETING AND CONSTRUCTING SHELBY COUNTY V.
HOLDER
As previously discussed, some scholars objecto to the ubiquity of the
construction zone, claiming that it either (1) does not exist, or (2) is sufficiently governed by fixation and constraint to alleviate concerns of judicial
overreach or deviation from the law’s true meaning. This section endeavors to discover the communicative content of the Appropriate Legislation
Clause to determine if such a constraining framework exists. It looks to the
semantic and contextual understanding of the word “appropriate” at the
time the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, the definitional understanding
of the word, its usage at the time, and its meaning in context with the Reconstruction Amendments and the Constitution as a whole. It also looks to
contemporary enforcement legislation and the original understanding of the
Framers.
A. Constitutional Interpretation
The search for a constraining principle begins with the “interpretation”
step, as defined by Professor Solum.
Following the interpretation/construction distinction, a judge’s initial responsibility when determining whether the Fifteenth Amendment abrogated the idea of state equal
sovereignty is to find the communicative content of the words “appropriate
legislation” by looking at both the semantic and contextual understanding
of the phrase55 using linguistic facts, history, and original intent to aid in
that determination.56
The language of the Fifteenth Amendment states that:
SECTION 1: [t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.
SECTION 2: The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.57

No definition of “appropriate legislation” is contained in the above text,
which has often been explained as the drafters’ intent for the meaning of
the phrase to be determined by Congress.58 This omission immediately telegraphs that the “original public meaning” of “appropriate legislation” is
likely to ultimately fall within both Justice Scalia and Professor Solum’s
55
56
57
58

See Solum, supra note 6, at 459.
See id. at 481, Fig. 3.
U.S. Const., amend. XV, §§ 1-2. [emphasis added].
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3D SESS., app., p. 163 (1869) (statement of Sen. Willard
Saulsbury). In relevant part, Mr. Saulsbury states that “appropriate legislation” is “a word not
defined in the instrument, but leaving its legitimate and proper meaning to be determined by each
particular head in this Senate Chamber and in the House of Representatives . . . .”
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understanding of “irreducibly vague.”59 Such a conclusion, however, would
be premature at this stage. First, a judge would need to look to other
sources for the semantic and contextual meaning of the phrase.
1. Semantic Content of “Appropriate Legislation”
The semantic meaning can be found by looking to contemporary dictionaries at the time of framing and by looking at the syntax of the phrase
or group of phrases surrounding it.60 Technically, the entire phrase “The
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation” could be subject to scrutiny. However, as there was no tension in the
Shelby County decision regarding the actual meaning of most of the sentence, focus should be placed on the word “appropriate,” Where the tension
between the majority and dissenting opinions lies.
The word “appropriate” can be used as either a verb or an adjective.
The word’s positioning in Section 2, however, is being used to modify the
word “legislation,” describing the type of legislation that Congress can use
as a vehicle to enforce the provisions of Section 1. Words that are used to
describe the surrounding nouns, as opposed to defining the action or state
of being of the noun, are adjectives.61 Thus, in this context, “appropriate”
is being employed as an adjective.
There were at least two main American dictionaries in circulation at the
time of ratification. The most prominent dictionary in circulation contemporaneously with the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment was The American Dictionary of the English Language Second Edition,62 which in later
editions would come to be known as Webster’s Dictionary. The American
Dictionary defines the adjective “appropriate” as follows:
1. Belonging peculiarly; peculiar; set apart for a particular use or person; as, religious worship is an appropriate duty to the Creator.
2. Most suitable, fit or proper; as, to use appropriate words in pleading. 63

The Dictionary of English Language, published in 1860, offers a similar definition: “consigned to some particular person or use; peculiar; fit;
adapted; suitable.”64 From these definitions, we can determine that “appro-

59
60
61
62
63
64

See Scalia, supra note 8, at 15; see also Solum, supra note 6, at 458.
See Solum, supra note 6-12 and accompanying text; see also Solum, supra note 6 at 459.
Adjective, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adjective; see
also, Verb, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/verb.
Noah Webster, THE AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, (2d ed. 1828), available at http://1828.mshaffer.com/d/word/appropriate.
Id.
Joseph A. Worchester, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGAUGE 72 (Hickling, Swan, and
Brewer,
eds.
1860),
available
at
https://ia600409.us.archive.org/14/items/cu31924027443393/cu31924027443393.pdf.
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priate legislation” either means “very particular or specific types of legislation,” or “through the most suitable or proper legislation.”
Only one understanding seems correct in the context of the entire Constitution. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments each contain an
identical section in their texts. These amendments were ratified in 1865
and 1868, respectively. Subsequent legislation passed as a direct result of
these amendments were not of a particular or specific type, other than the
fact that they related to the subject matter of their respective amendments.
Moreover, if “appropriate” were used as “particular” in this framework to
mean “related to the subject-matter of the Amendment,” it would nullify
the significance of the word. All federal laws must be grounded in a Constitutional power, and so any law based on a particular amendment would
necessarily be related to the subject matter.
It appears, then, that when Congress and the States ratified that “[t]he
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation,” it granted Congress the power to enact “the most suitable, fit or proper” legislation. Of course, this new definition begs the question: “what is
the most suitable, fit, or proper legislation?” This definition seems just as,
if not more, vague than the initial word “appropriate,” as it simply adds
more indeterminate words.
2. Contextual Enrichment of “Appropriate Legislation”
The initial inquiry into the semantic meaning of “appropriate” legislation seems to have yielded no definitive result. However, a word or phrase
that continues to be ambiguous or vague after a semantic investigation is
not yet necessarily “irreducibly ambiguous or vague.” Constitutional interpretation allows for an investigation into the context in which a word or
phrase was written.65 As discussed above, this is done by looking into both
the history and original intent of the drafters.66 Therefore, investigation
into the contextual content of Section 2 is required.
a. Constitutional Context
When looking at the context of a word or phrase, the inquiry should
begin with the surrounding text. Both the explicit language of the Constitution and precedent surrounding the understanding of “appropriate legislation” at the time of the Fifteenth Amendment’s drafting could provide insight into the contemporary public meaning of the provision. At the time
of framing, the phrase “appropriate legislation” had been used in only two
other constitutional clauses: the enforcement sections of the Thirteenth and
65
66

See Solum, supra note 6 at 481, Fig. 3.
Id.
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Fourteenth Amendments. Additionally, in Shelby County, Justice Ginsburg
provides a strong argument that the understanding of the Necessary and
Proper Clause enabled Congress to enact legislation like section 4(b),
which can be corroborated by statements from contemporary legislators.
When the Fifteenth Amendment was drafted, the language “appropriate
legislation” could be found in Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment 67
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.68 Ratification of those
amendments occurred years before ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, and so legislation or judicial decisions that surrounded enforcement
legislation of the first Reconstruction Amendments colored the understanding of “appropriate legislation” here.
Unfortunately for the purpose of context, Congress did not pass a swath
of legislation following the ratification of these Amendments. Indeed,
Congress passed only one major bill following each: The Freedman’s Bureau Act of 1865 and The Civil Rights Act of 1866. While these bills certainly show that Congress, the Court, and the Nation were not of one mind
regarding the extent of “appropriate legislation,” neither directly dealt with
the idea of state equal sovereignty. The Freedman’s Bureau “empowered
bureau agents both to assume jurisdiction of cases involving blacks and to
punish state officials who denied the civil rights white persons possessed.”69 The Civil Rights Act guaranteed the rights of all citizens regardless of race and color and equal protection under the law.70 It also empowered federal agents to prosecute violations of the law in federal court,
including violations under state law.71
Both laws created federal supremacy when enforcing laws relating
these amendments in the states, and both laws used the courts as their primary vehicle for doing so. Both laws were also ultimately abandoned, either due to intense political opposition or by decree of the Supreme Court.
However, these short-lived laws do not provide significant insight into the
understanding of what “appropriate legislation” could mean in this context
because neither act applied different standards to different states. From the
contextual usage of “appropriate legislation” alone, we can garner no clear
understanding of whether Congress, or the nation as a whole, contemplated
an abrogation of state equal sovereignty.
Next, we turn to Justice Ginsburg’s precedential argument in Shelby
County, which also attempts to provide evidence of the phrase’s contextual
meaning. Her dissent argued that the specific language of “appropriate leg67
68
69
70
71

U.S. CONST., amend. XIII, § 2.
U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5.
Frank J. Scaturro, THE SUPREME COURT’S RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 8 (Greenwood
Press, eds. 2000).
Id.
Id.
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islation” meant that the Framers of the Fifteenth Amendment intended to
incorporate the scope of congressional power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, as described in McCulloch v. Maryland.72 While Framer
intent does not equate to contextual meaning, Justice Ginsburg argued that
McCulloch’s language can provide color to the word as it is used in the Fifteenth Amendment.
The dissent quoted portions of McCulloch that describe congressional
authority and paralleled the use of “appropriate” as it is used to delineate
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause with the enforcement provision of the Fifteenth Amendment. In McCulloch, Justice Marshall writes:
“let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution.”73 The dissent then uses this language to argue that “[i]t cannot tenably be maintained that the [Voting Rights Act], an Act of Congress adopted to shield the right to vote from racial discrimination, is inconsistent with
the letter or spirit of the Fifteenth Amendment.”74 Because the Framers of
the Fifteenth Amendment were aware of McCulloch during the ratification
of all the Reconstruction Amendments, Justice Ginsburg argues, the specific phrasing of Justice Marshall’s famous quote is more likely to have been
the original source of this language not previously used in the Constitution.
The dissent further argues that the word “appropriate” implied statutes
that were “consistent with the letter and spirit of the Fifteenth Amendment.” From this, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the Fifteenth Amendment’s “transformative” effect on congressional powers “to enact ‘appropriate’ legislation targeting state abuses” allows § 4(b) to continue to be an
appropriate use of legislation.75
However, while this precedential argument could strengthen the argument for the constitutionality of § 4(b), the totality of the evidence surrounding the provision’s constitutional context is, at best, inconclusive because McCulloch did not deal with the issue of state equal sovereignty. In
her dissent, Justice Ginsburg took the vague understanding from McCulloch and used other tools of construction to properly apply McCulloch’s
understanding to the issue in Shelby County. Her conclusion is not based
solely upon the semantic and communicative content of the text, and so it is
72
73

74
75

See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2636-38 (2013) (discussing scope of Necessary
Proper Clause).
Id. at 2637 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)). It should also be noted that
McCulloch, decided several decades prior, can be viewed as either (1) canonical law which all
lawyers at the time would be aware of, or (2) a decades-old case not considered in the fall-out of
the most devastating war on U.S. soil. Both are reasonable arguments and increase the ambiguity
and uncertainty of its application to the Fifteenth Amendment.
Id.
Id.
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still acceptable for Justice Roberts to assert that abrogating state equal sovereignty is not an appropriate method to effectuate the right of individuals
to vote regardless of race or class. Justice Ginsburg’s argument, while
well-reasoned, cannot militate against Justice Roberts’ reasoning because it
is not wholly based upon a constraining principle in the interpretation
phase. Without contemporary legislation or judicial decisions that deal
specifically with the states’ equal sovereignty, we cannot be sure of the Fifteenth Amendment framers’ intent for “appropriate.”
b. Congressional and State Sentiment Regarding Section 2
While the communicative content can garner no constraining principle,
a judge still has other avenues to explore before determining a text to be
irreducibly vague. For many contemporary originalists, any legitimate
constraining principle would require that § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act be
determined constitutional because the original public meaning of “appropriate legislation” was understood to empower Congress to enact laws that
are reasonably necessary to promote substantively equal rights. Of course,
this is a difficult task, and often the only available documentation that illustrates the understanding of legislation is through the perspective of the legislators themselves. However, while these documents are an imperfect
standard upon which to base the public’s ultimate understanding of the text,
they can be a good starting point.
It is difficult to discern which contemporary statements accurately portray the polity’s understanding of a specific piece of legislation, as no one
statement can encapsulate the diverse opinions of the entire nation. We can
hope, however, that statements made by political actors on the House and
Senate floors are at least somewhat representative of a general sentiment,
as those actors are held accountable by their constituents. Congressional
session documents during the Amendment’s ratification seem to imply that
there was consensus among supporters and detractors that the Appropriate
Legislation Clause would revolutionize the balance between state and federal sovereignty in the context of election law,76 but there is no clear consensus about what form that revolution would take.
There is some contemporary evidence of legislators’ understandings of
“appropriate legislation” as it pertained to the Fifteenth Amendment. For
example, in May 1870, the House considered a bill entitled “An act to enforce the rights of citizens to vote in the United States and the several

76

See generally John Mabry Matthews, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT 20-37 (2001) (discussing the formation of the Amendment and its improvements
upon past legislative failures to impose federal guidelines upon individual states).
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States of this Union, and for other purposes.”77 The Act reaffirmed the
right to vote granted by Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, banned voting prerequisites enacted by states, and created punishments for official and
other persons who tried to limit a person’s right to vote through threats or
intimidation.78 During the session, Representative John Stiles (PA) and
Michael Kerr (IN), who opposed the Act, contended that all but the first
portion of the bill, which reaffirmed the rights of all individuals to vote,
was unconstitutional.79 In response, Representative Noah Davis of New
York, one of the Act’s supporters, responded with an argument similar to
Justice Ginsburg’s argument in Shelby County:
“Appropriate” means that which is necessary and proper to accomplish the end.
Congress, then, is clothed with so much power as is necessary and proper to enforce the two amendments80 to the Constitution, and is to judge from the exigencies of the case what is necessary and proper.81

From this, Representative Davis argued that the entire Act was constitutional. With this understanding, the bill passed with a majority vote.
Of course, these statements alone cannot show either general legislative
intent or public meaning. Representatives Johnson and Kerr could not have
believed that “appropriate legislation” granted all powers “necessary and
proper to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment” if they rejected the bill for being unconstitutional. Indeed, Representative Davis made his remarks in response to Representative Johnson, who asserted before the House that
while the Fifteenth Amendment was the supreme law of the land, the Act
itself was an unconstitutional and “fatal blow at State rights.”82 They could
not have believed that the Fifteenth Amendment’s “appropriate legislation”
clause granted necessary and proper powers to abridge state sovereignty if
they simultaneously (1) rejected the bill as unconstitutional but (2) accepted the legitimacy of the Amendment upon which the bill stood.
Beyond this, there is conflicting evidence regarding the autonomy of
the branches to determine what constitutes “appropriate legislation.” For
example, Republican Representative Jeremiah Wilson of Indiana discussed
the understanding of “appropriate legislation” before the Congress in April
1871, after the Fifteenth Amendment had been ratified. He argued, “Con-

77

78
79

80
81
82

Enforcement Act of 1870, c. 114, 16 Stat. 141. The bill’s name was referenced in the Congressional Debate of Representative Stiles of Pennsylvania, Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2nd sess., p.
3881.
Id.
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. 3877, 3880-81 (1870). In his speech, Rep. Davis references
Rep. Michael Kerr (IN) as ultimately finding the bill unconstitutional. However, Rep. Davis had
yielded his time to Rep. Johnson, who made the statements referenced above.
Here, Rep. Davis is referring to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment, which are the enforcement provisions of both.
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. 3882 (1870).
Stiles of Pennsylvania, Cong. Record, 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., p. 3881.
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gress is not only the exclusive judge of necessity for the application of
remedies, but also the exclusive judge of what the remedies shall be.”83
This statement implies that the Amendment empowered Congress to determine the extent to which the Tenth Amendment would be abrogated,
which could make Justice Roberts’ argument unfounded.
However, we can also see from the full context of Representative Wilson’s remarks that his interpretation was vehemently opposed. Senator
William Hamilton of Maryland, for example, was among a group of strict
constructionists who believed that Section 2 conferred Congress with no
affirmative power of legislation, but rather empowered the courts to enforce the Constitution.84 In fact, Senator Hamilton goes on to assert than
any such legislation by Congress would be immediately declared unconstitutional by the Courts,85 directly contradicting Representative Wilson’s implied assertion.
Other early attempts to give universal suffrage to African American
voters during the Reconstruction Era were also hotly contested in both
Northern and Southern states. The Amendment, which was first presented
in late 1866, was feared to abridge state sovereignty of loyal states86 as well
as to subject Southern states to intense federal control.87 Many statements
by congressional representatives at the time that expressly stated that Sec-

83

Wilson of Indiana, Cong. Record, 42d Cong., 1st sess., p. 482 -83.
WILSON: And now sir, who is to judge as to the necessity for congressional intervention? Congress must be the exclusive judge. It is for Congress to look to the question
whether or not the State affords that protection the Constitution requires, and if it does
not, then to provide the proper remedies. And under this section Congress is not only the
exclusive judge of the necessity for the application of remedies, but is also the exclusive
judge of what the remedies shall be . . . . What is “appropriate legislation?” It is legislation adequate to meet the difficulties to be encountered, to suppress the wrongs existing,
to furnish remedies and [to] inflict penalties adequate to the suppression of all infractions
of the rights of citizens. And of what is necessary to this end Congress alone must be the
judge . . . .
This portion of the Representative’s speech, discussing “House Bill 320 – to enforce the provisions of
the fourteenth amendment,” offers a unique insight into the Congressional understanding of “appropriate legislation” because it directly discusses the judicial discretion/ judicial supremacy divide. Representative Wilson’s remarks are in response to the “gentleman from Kentucky” (Representative James Beck) who had previously asserted that section 4 of the fourteenth amendment
– which is identical to section 2 of the fifteenth amendment – allowed only for remedy in Court.
84
See Matthews, supra note 76 (describing the general understanding of the enforcement legislation that Congress believed it had under the Fifteenth Amendment).
85
Hamilton of Maryland, Globe, 41st Cong., 2d sess., Appendix, p. 354. In full, he states:
The amendment is negative upon the power of Congress and is complete in itself. The
exercise of any such power thus prohibited by congressional legislation is simply unconstitutional and void, and would be so declared by the appropriate tribunals upon appeal
by the aggrieved to them.
86
See Matthews, supra note 76, at 12-13. Northern states recognized that a form of abrogation of
state autonomy would necessarily take place when passing a law requiring suffrage, and therefore resisted any bills targeted at any state. The states that resisted surrendering power included
New York, Connecticut, Ohio, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Kansas. Id. at 13.
87
See generally Id. at 20-37 (discussing the general formation of the Fifteenth Amendment).
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tion 2 required substantial congressional interference to enforce the primary
provision of the Fifteenth Amendment were vehemently opposed.88
For example, Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin, a visceral opponent of the
Amendment, believed that it would allow Congress to “appoint judges at
the election-polls; to send officers to attend the elections to secure order; to
count the votes and secure the votes of colored men in determining the result-in short, to control the elections.”89 Senator Doolittle also discussed
how even the Amendment’s proponents recognized that it would abrogate
state sovereignty.90 The Hon. H. Wilson, a supporter of the Amendment,
conceded as much in his impassioned speech before the Assembly in rebuttal to Congressman Doolittle’s speech.91
Not all contemporary voices believed that Section 2 would abrogate
state sovereignty, however. In fact, many contemporaries understood Section 2 to be a merely declaratory resolution whose power could not be
wielded in reality.92 These critics maintained that, like Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, implementing any such legislation would be both
inefficient and difficult to execute.93 Other congressional representatives
similarly thought that Section 2 would remain dormant only until a particular state or collection of states refused to enact appropriate legislation on its
own, thus conferring a type of concurrent authority between the Congress
and the States.94
State political figures appeared no more united on the effect of the Fifteenth Amendment than did their federal counterparts. Many states ratified

88

See Id. at 48 (discussing the particular manner in which Congress debated taking control of the
vote).
89
Doolittle of Wisconsin, Globe, 40th Cong., 3d sess., Appendix, at 151. See also Matthews, supra
note 76 at 49 (“Under it Congress might send ‘satraps’ into every election district in the country,
and relieve the States from all further attention to the subject.”).
90
Id.
91
Hon. H. Wilson, Globe, 40th Cong., 3d ses., Appendix at 154. The relevant portions of the
speech are as follows.
“[The Honorable Senators] tell us we were pledged by our national convention of 1868;
that we were committed to the doctrine that the right to regulate the suffrage properly belonged to the loyal States. So the earlier Republican national conventions proclaimed
that slavery in the States was a local institution, for which the people of each State only
were responsible. But that declaration did not stand in the way of the proclamation did
not stand in the way of the proclamation of emancipation, did not stand in the way of the
thirteenth article of the amendments of the Constitution . . . The declaration that the suffrage in the loyal States properly belonged to the people of those States meant this, no
more, no less: that under the Constitution it belonged to the people of each of the loyal
States to regulate suffrage therein.” (emphasis added).
This final sentence directly implies that the States were never the sole proprietors of election administration, but rather the people who were eligible to participate in the vote. This statement can be
interpreted to either abrogate state sovereignty through the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment or suggest that States were never endowed with such sovereignty.
92
See Matthews, supra note 76, at 49.
93
See id.
94
Axtell of California, Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 258.
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the Amendment without incident,95 which gives little indication as to
whether those state legislators agreed with their colleagues in Congress
about the Amendment’s effects. Florida and Michigan, however, provide
some insight into the view of Amendment-friendly states. For example, the
Florida governor championed the resolution as a homogenization of the
states. From this, one could argue that state equal sovereignty was left intact, especially when one recognizes that while some states would be more
affected than others during the transition, no individual state was held to a
different standard than any other state.
However, the Florida Assembly minority party raised the familiar adverse argument that “suffrage was properly a local matter, to be regulated
by each State for itself,” and that the Constitution did not justify “one or
many states from prescribing suffrage regulations for another.”96 Similarly,
the Committee on Federal Relations in the Michigan House issued a report,
stating that “[t]he proposed Amendment is an encroachment upon the rights
of the States . . . and tends to weaken and destroy the checks and balances
wisely framed by the fathers of the Republic.”97 These remarks from the
Amendment’s detractors could be seen as evidence that the Amendment
was indeed believed to abrogate states’ equal sovereignty.
The mixed messages issued by members of opposite parties make it impossible to determine the final consensus of the Amendment, if one ever
existed. What we know is that the Amendment passed the House and the
Senate with a two-thirds majority in the House and the Senate in February
186998 and was ratified by three-fourths of the states in February 1870. 99
This does not mean, however, that the debates created an understanding
amongst the polity that the Amendment abrogated state equal sovereignty,
or that it was passed over the objections of the minority. It could mean that
the majority, recognizing that the vote and ratification would be incredibly
close, conceded the idea of abrogation to secure ratification. What is more
likely, however, is that the idea of state equal sovereignty was not considered by either the Framers or the ratifying states. In either event, we cannot
know from the constitutional context, legislation, or the debates themselves. There is simply no consensus from the legislators to make an adequate determination of what was considered “appropriate.”
There are many similar floor debates surrounding the understanding of
“appropriate.” This cycle of investigation and comparison could continue

95
96
97
98

99

See Matthews, supra note 76, at 58-62.
See Id. at 64.
See MATTHEWS, supra note 76 at 58.
African Americans and the Fifteenth Amendment, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION,
available
at
http://www.crf-usa.org/black-history-month/african-americans-and-the-15thamendment. [hereinafter “African Americans”].
See id.
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for much longer than this comment will allow, and the results would likely
resemble the parry and riposte that is seen above. A legal rule cannot be
created solely from the communicative content of these discussions.
c. Contemporary Legislation
Clearly, no consensus existed on the congressional floor concerning the
parameters of Section 2 such that one can discern a constraining principle.
As a final avenue of investigation, one must look to contemporary legislation that was proposed and passed under the Fifteenth Amendment to enforce the provisions of Section 1.
As previously discussed, the only contemporary law designed specifically to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment was the Enforcement Act of
1870. 100 While floor debates proved unhelpful, this section looks to the
effects of the legislation on states’ obligations. This bill was relatively
tame in comparison to the grand rhetoric of the Republican Party, as it did
not infringe upon the States’ ability to regulate their own elections.101 To
be sure, the bill was decried on both sides as either a usurpation of Congressional authority or “an excellent recipe for pretending to do something
without accomplishing anything.”102 However, as the bill was the single
contemporary bill to reach beyond the congressional floor into the President’s office for signing, it is strong evidence that this bill was the congressional consensus on the extent of “appropriate legislation.” While the Act
brought all states under the enforcement of the federal government, it did
so equally to each. From the bill’s language, it appears that Congress did
not intend to abrogate state equal sovereignty.
It is also worth noting that a preliminary bill came before the House
floor that could not be passed. H.R. 1815, a precursor to the Enforcement
Act, was brought before the House of Representatives on April 18, 1870.103
The bill reiterated the first section of the Fifteenth Amendment, assessed
potential fines and imprisonment of state officials who contravened the bill,
afforded methods of recourse for false claims, and granted a private right of
action for persons deprived of their office under the Act.104 Generally, the
text of the bill gave Courts the power to adjudicate any voting deprivations,
after the fact, while withholding executive authority to take affirmative
100
101

102
103
104

See MATTHEWS, supra note 76 at 79.
See MATTHEWS, supra note 76 at 79-81. The bill as a whole made a declaratory statement that
reiterated the goals of the Fifteenth Amendment’s first section, levied fines and imprisonment
upon public officials who denied or abridged the right to vote, banned the use of discrimination
by the assessors of taxes in states where such measures are used to enfranchise citizens, and
banned judges or inspectors of elections from doing the same. Id.
See MATTHEWS, supra note 76 at 81.
H.R. 1815, 41st Cong., 2d. sess., U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS AND DEBATES, 1774-1875.
See id.

Apr. 2016]

ORIGINALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

23

acts. This original language also strongly favors an argument that the Fifteenth Amendment was never intended to abrogate state equal sovereignty.
The Senate’s sister bill provides more insight and adds credence to this
view. The Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the House Bill in its entirety, and proposed legislation that would reach all methods of white interference with the minority, including more invasive restrictions by Congress.105
This re-writing, and subsequent failure of the new bill, could imply a general consensus that greater invasions upon states’ ability to regulate themselves were not “appropriate” to secure voting rights.
Beyond specific enforcement, Congress also enacted H.R. 1305, which
was entitled “a bill to remove political disabilities in States ratifying and
conforming their constitutions and laws to the provisions of the Fifteenth
Amendment . . . .”106 As its title suggests, the bill allowed states that ratified the Fifteenth Amendment to be removed from their reconstruction disabilities under the Fourteenth Amendment.107 This ratification prerequisite
could be seen as an abrogation of equal sovereignty. However, it could also be argued that the southern states were no longer functioning in their capacities as “states” during this reconstruction period.108 On the other hand,
the bill’s text explicitly mentions “the legislature of any State of the United
States,” rather than as a territory. The southern states that had been readmitted to the Union were given varying degrees of sovereignty regarding
their right to hold office in Congress. Because this bill regarding acceptance of the Fifteenth Amendment codified the acceptability of this disparate treatment, it could be argued that there was a general understanding
that Congress already had the ability to abrogate equal sovereignty in the
voting context.
Of course, approximately a quarter of the states were in no position to
vote on the bill, as their admittance back into Congress had not yet taken
place. Moreover, this bill was not specifically enacted through the “appro-
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See MATTHEWS, supra note 76 at 82-83.
H.R. 1305, 41st Cong., 2d sess., U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS AND DEBATES, 1774-1875.
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and
Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. U.S. Const. am. XIV.
The former Confederate States were readmitted to the Union from 1865-1870, with Georgia being the final state to rejoin in July 1870. Several states – including South Carolina, Florida,
Georgia, Mississippi, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee – had been readmitted when this
bill was proposed to the House in February 1870. See Reconstruction: The Second Civil War,
pbs.org, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reconstruction /states/sf_timeline2.html
(outlining the timeline of Reconstruction in America from 1861-1877).

24

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:

priate legislation” provision of the Fifteenth Amendment at all, but rather
through both the Fifteenth Amendment and Congress’ Article IV powers.109
In light of this, using this bill to prove that Section 2 was understood to abrogate equal sovereignty becomes tenuous. Contemporary congressional
legislation, it appears, was not actively concerned with the idea of equal
sovereignty, and so a restraining principle remains elusive.
As it remains unclear whether abrogation of state equal sovereignty is
“appropriate legislation” to guarantee the voting rights of citizens, there is
no way to eradicate the vagueness of the phrase in such a way that a constraining principle can be created and applied to the facts of Shelby County.
The original understanding of “appropriate legislation,” while constraining
any final legal rule, is sufficiently vague to warrant further constitutional
construction for a judge deciding this case.
B. Constitutional Construction and Original Utility
The search to find a constraining principle in the communicative content of the phrase “appropriate legislation” has failed. Armed with the
vague and loosely constraining framework that Congress may enforce the
Amendment by the most suitable, fit, or proper legislation, any judge
would now be required to construct, not interpret, an actual rule from
which to decide this case. To do so, he or she has the ability to select a
normative theory of construction.
As discussed in Section IA, the selection of a normative theory would
not conflict with the rules of fixation and restraint if the text is sufficiently
vague. Thus, neither Justices Roberts’ nor Justice Ginsburg’s interpretive
approaches in Shelby County contravene originalist doctrine, as neither the
majority nor the dissent argued that the words “appropriate legislation” definitively precluded or militated a certain conclusion. Rather, Justice Ginsburg argued that in the presence of a vague proposition, the Court should
defer to Congress110 and Justice Roberts instead championed the continued
importance of state equal sovereignty.111
Both approaches are normative theories of constitutional construction.
Justice Ginsburg employed a Thayerian constitutional deference ap-
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U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3. Under Section 3, “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.” Id.
See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2637-38 (2013) (Ginsurg, J., dissenting) (arguing
that in cases involving “appropriate legislation” enacted by Congress to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment, the Court should defer to Congressional findings).
See id. at 2644 (describing Chief Justice Roberts’ explanation of how equal sovereignty can only
be abrogated in specific circumstances).
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proach112 and Justice Roberts employed a theory that gave deference to
federalism and states’ equal sovereignty.113 Both justices interpreted the
text in a way that did not contradict the natural or reasonable meaning of
the language, which is as far as constitutional interpretation purports to go,
whether the understanding of “original interpretation” is from Justice Scalia
or Professor Solum. It seems, then, that originalism leaves the work only
half finished.
It is the responsibility of judges and justices to not only determine what
text means, but to decide cases. There must be a process by which the
text’s communicative content is applied to the facts of the case. While Justice Scalia argued in Reading Law that the Fair Readings Method continues
this process without allowing judges to stray into their own predilections,114
this textual interpretation is no longer originalism, but rather another normative theory of construction.
While both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg – admittedly in
deed more than word – adhered to the originalist tenets of fixation and constraint, the reasonable meaning of “appropriate language” was ultimately
irreducibly vague and unhelpful as a constraining principle. The two justices then reached opposing positions, which can always result when interpreting intentionally vague propositions.
The term “appropriate legislation” is vague and was likely intended to
be so. Constitutional provisions are added only after intense debate and nationwide political upset. Political parties, and personal opinions, are likely
to be disparate. In order to come to some form of consensus, constitutional
language that goes beyond a discrete, specific rule must be vague in order
to accommodate and overshadow the ultimate lack of consensus by the polity. This vagueness precludes the opportunity for most constitutional decisions to rely solely on the text of the document. Other forms of constitutional interpretation are required in order to create an actual rule and
holding for a particular case. However, if other normative forms of constitutional decision-making are required to reach an ultimate adjudication,
then originalism neither constrains judges nor facilitates a definitive conclusion of what the law is.
Unfortunately for originalists who uphold the tenets of judicial constraint and fidelity to the law, construction opens the door to judicial discre112
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For a greater explanation of Thayerianism, see James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140-44 (1893). See also Solum,
supra note 6 at 516-17 (describing, in greater detail, the modern version of Thayerian constitutional deference).
This is also known as the federalism canon, which instructs that ambiguities in federal statutes
should be construed not to interfere with traditional state functions. Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal
Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 755 WM. & MARY L. REV.
753, 763 (2013).
See notes 33-45, supra, and accompanying text.
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tion almost as much as if an investigation of the original meaning had never
been done. Whether a judge follows Justice Scalia’s Fair Reading Method,
Justice Ginsburg’s congressional deference approach, or another theory of
constitutional interpretation, the judge will be choosing between one or another normative interpretive theory.
If this is true, then perhaps it is strange that originalism is so championed. It does not appear to bring us closer to a definitive answer of the law
in situations where it would be most needed. Shelby County is just one example of the result of a probing analysis into the original public meaning of
a constitutional phrase, which produced, at best, a nominally constraining
principle. Perhaps this means that originalism cannot constrain judges.
Constitutional construction requires normative, subjective theories. Even if
a judge looked first at the original public meaning of a text, she could still
choose between several normative theories that will get her to the conclusion that she finds most desirable. The problem with a judge cloaking herself in “originalism” is that she can then argue that she is being entirely rational and disinterested, when in fact she is deciding cases that best fit with
her ideological views.
Why, then, should we require judges first to look to the consensus of
the polity in the late 1860s when no true consensus can be found? In light
of the philosophy’s ineffectiveness, the exercise begins to look like an appeal to our storied forefathers to reach a desired outcome. If we must appeal to the understanding of a particular divided group, why not look to the
understanding of those currently alive? Current citizens have an understanding of what those words mean in our contemporary context that more
readily applies to any facts with which a judge will be presented. Perhaps
their understanding should bear more weight, if no prior consensus can ever be found.
CONCLUSION
In many situations, of which Shelby County is one, originalism neither
constrains judges nor discovers the law, and so perhaps academic scholarship should stop pretending that it does. Professor Solum has presented a
theory distinguishing between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction during judicial decision-making, and general originalism philosophy falls squarely within the constitutional interpretation step.
While the theory can be a helpful starting point in this role, it often ultimately fails to live up to its espoused tenets of judicial constraint and fidelity to the law. This comment provided a hypothetical study into the ultimate decisions of the Shelby County v. Holder decision to examine one
instance of this. The Appropriate Legislation Clause is sufficiently vague
that it is possible for two judges following the tenets of fixation and constraint to still construct two diametrically opposed holdings because a thor-
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ough and probing view into the original public meaning provided an ambiguous definition of the word “appropriate” and no truly constraining
principle could be found. In light of this, originalism seems to lose its import. If the philosophy cannot deliver on its two most important tenets,
then perhaps we should stop elevating it as the philosophy of the rational
and impartial judge.

